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Abstract
The causal and simulation theories are often presented as very distinct views
about  declarative  memory,  their  major  difference  lying  on  the  causal
condition. The causal theory states that remembering involves an accurate
representation  causally  connected  to  an  earlier  experience  (the  causal
condition). In  the  simulation  theory, remembering  involves  an  accurate
representation  generated  by  a  reliable  memory  process  (no  causal
condition). I investigate how to construe detailed versions of these theories
that  correctly  classify memory  errors  (DRM,  “lost  in  the  mall”,  and
memory-conjunction errors) as misremembering or confabulation. Neither
causalists  nor  simulationists  have  paid  attention  to  memory-conjunction
errors, which  is  unfortunate  because  both  theories  have  problems  with
these cases. The source of the difficulty is the background assumption that
an act of remembering has one (and only one) target. I fix these theories for
those cases. The resulting versions are closely related when implemented
using tools of information theory, differing only on how memory transmits
information about the past. The implementation provides us with insights
about  the  distinction  between  confabulatory  and  non-confabulatory
memory, where memory-conjunction errors have a privileged position.
Keywords
Episodic memory, memory-conjunction errors, causal theory of memory,
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1 Introduction
In this  paper, I  use memory errors  to examine the main theories  of
declarative memory: causal  theory (Bernecker 2010; Robins  2016b),
which  states  that  remembering  requires  having  an  accurate
representation  standing  in  a  causal  connection  with  an  earlier
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experience  (the causal  condition), and simulation theory (Michaelian
2016b), which  states  that  remembering  requires  having  an  accurate
representation  generated  by  a  reliable  memory  process  (no  causal
condition). These  theories  are often presented as  very distinct  views
about memory, their major difference lying on the causal condition. I
start  by discussing how to model  different versions of these theories
using tools of theory of reference. The causal theory is presented in two
versions: direct  (Bernecker  2010)  and  indirect  (Robins  2016b). The
simulation theory is only presented in an indirect version (Michaelian
2016b). Then I test how the resulting models classify memory errors as
misremembering  (inaccurate  memories)  or  confabulation  (roughly,
fabricated memories).
The  errors  I  survey  result  from three  experimental  paradigms:
DRM (Deese 1959; Roediger and McDermott 1995), “lost in the mall”
(Loftus and Pickrell 1995), and memory-conjunction errors (Reinitz et
al. 1992). The first two errors are used to discuss minor difficulties for
the  theories;  the  main  action  comes  from  the  analysis  of  memory-
conjunction errors. Neither causalists nor simulationists have paid due
attention  to  memory-conjunction  errors.  As  a  result,  the  existing
versions of  these theories have difficulties with these cases.  Memory-
conjunction errors are cases of misremembering due to ambiguity in
target  selection, but  both  theories  share  the  background assumption
that  an  act  of  remembering  has  one  (and  only  one)  target. The
background assumption is  reflected in  the  accuracy  condition  of  the
(direct  and  indirect)  causal  and  simulation  theories  and  in  the
counterfactual causal condition of (some) causal theories.
The surveyed direct causal theory cannot be fixed for the problem
cases  because  of  both  its  direct  and counterfactual  features. Robins’
theory and Michaelian’s theories, on the other hand, can be worked out.
The  accuracy  condition  should  be  modeled  using  a  plural  target
selection  function  and  the  causal  condition  must  be  reduced  to  a
probabilistic  (minimal)  condition.  The  resulting  theories are  closely
related when implemented using tools of information theory, differing
only  on  how  memory  transmits  information  about  the  past.  The
implementation provides us with insights about the distinction between
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confabulatory  and  non-confabulatory  memory,  where  memory-
conjunction errors have a privileged position.
In §2, I use tools of the theory of reference to model the accuracy
condition of the causal (direct and indirect) and simulation theories. The
causal and reliability conditions are modeled using counterfactuals and
probabilities  (respectively).  I  survey  how  Robins  and  Michaelian
distinguish  misremembering  from confabulation. In  §3, I  survey  the
experimental  results  of  DRM,  “lost  in  the  mall”,  and  memory-
conjunction  errors  and  investigate  how  the  causal  and  simulation
theories classify these  errors as misremembering or confabulation. In
§4, I fix the causal and simulation theories for the problem cases and
implement the resulting theories using tools of information theory.
2 Setting the stage
Declarative memory is the capacity of retrieving information that can,
at least in principle, be brought to consciousness. Researchers of the
field usually agree that declarative memory has two poles. Bernecker
(2010: 14)  distinguishes  object-, property-, and event-memory from
propositional memory; Robins (2020: 122) and Michaelian (2016b: 31)
work  with  the  standard  distinction  between  episodic  and  semantic
memory.  These  classifications  use  different  criteria  and  exhibit
categories with different intensions and extensions. For example, while
the  distinction  between  object-,  property-,  and  event-memory  and
propositional memory builds upon the targets of acts of remembering,
the distinction between episodic and semantic memory builds upon the
experience involved in such acts. Episodic (but not semantic) memory
involves  mental  reenactments  of  earlier  experiences,  “mental  time
travel” (Tulving 1985). In the following, «remembering» refers to the
mental experience involved in the episodic memory.
Most often, the mental reenactment in a «remembering» involves
mental  representations. Mental  representations  (in  general)  have  two
structural  features:  targets  and  content  (Cummins  1996).  Robins
(2020: 123)  offers  an account  of  these  features  for  «remembering»s
specifically. The targets of a «remembering» is what it is attempting to
represent. The  content  of  a  «remembering»  is  how it  represents  its
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targets1. The accuracy of a «remembering» can be measured from the
(mis)match between features of targets and how they are represented in
the content. Most of the researches on declarative memory share the
background assumption that a «remembering» has one (and only one)
target. The assumption is made explicit by the use of the definite article
‘the’ for qualifying ‘target’. For example, “the target is a particular event
or experience in the representer’s personal past” (Robins 2020: 123)2.
Bernecker  works  with  propositional  memory;  Michaelian  and
Robins, with episodic memory. Most cases of episodic memory are not
cases of propositional memory, in the sense of having targets that are
not propositions, but Bernecker (2017: 3)  claims that some cases  of
propositional memory are episodic, in the sense of being accompanied
by  (episodic)  «remembering»s.  I  use  the  expression  ‘memory  of
individuals’ as  a  means of  focusing on the cases  of  episodic memory
whose  targets  are  concrete  individuals:  people,  objects,  events
(including  mental  events), etc. In  the  following, all  «remembering»s
target concrete individuals. Since all cases of memory of individuals are
episodic, this emphasis will not be a problem in the discussion about
simulation  theory.  The  same  is  not  true  for  causal  theory,  since
Bernecker,  but  not  Robins,  works  with  propositional  memory.  My
conclusions may not apply to propositional memory.
2.1 Causal theory
The causal  theory states  that  successfully  remembering an individual
requires having an accurate representation of that individual standing in
an appropriate causal connection with an earlier experience of it. This is
the classical formulation of the causal theory, where “he” successfully
remembers “something past” only if:
1 The content  of  a  «remembering» may encapsulate  mental  images,  conceptual
content and other phenomenological features, such as the feeling of pastness (Robins
2020: 124). For simplicity, I refer to all these features as ‘representations’.
2 Likewise, Michaelian (2016b: 103) states that “simulation is a matter of drawing
on a range of past experiences to produce a… representation of  the target episode”.
Bernecker (2010: 163) states that “this raises the question to what degree a memory
report must correspond to the target stimulus to count as accurate” (my emphases).
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1. Within certain limits of accuracy he represents that past thing. 2. If the
thing was ‘public’, then he observed what he now represents. If the thing
was ‘private’, then it was his. 3. His past experience of the thing was
operative in producing a state or successive states in him finally operative
in producing his representation. (Martin and Deutscher 1966: 166)
In the following, ‘accuracy condition’ refers to (1) and ‘causal condition’
refers to (3), where the notion of being “operative” refers to a causal
connection3.
The  definition  of  the  accuracy  condition  depends  on  how  the
theory describes the content and target selection. The causal theory has
two versions: direct (Bernecker 2008) and indirect (Robins 2016b). I
focus on the direct version because the proposed causal and simulation
theories  are  indirect,  where the  difficulties  of  a  direct  theory  will
motivate  some of  their  features, but  I  will  also discuss  a  provisional
indirect causal theory. Bernecker describes his theory as being “direct”
and opposes  it  to the “representative” (indirect)  theories. His  “direct
theory” is an unstable because it implements opposing intuitions: “We
do  not  remember  the  past  by  virtue  of  being  aware  of  an  image
presenting the past to us, rather our awareness of the past is direct”, but
“memory  is  indirect  in  the  sense  that  it  involves  internal
representations” (2008: 67 and 8). For this reason, Aranyosi (2020: 8)
thinks  that  Bernecker’s  theory  “does  not  deserve  the  name  ‘direct
realism about memory’”. I will not discuss this issue here.
What  I  will  try  to  do  is  to  reconcile  Bernecker’s  opposing
intuitions: a «remembering» involves mental representations, but grants
direct  access  to  its  targets. As  I  understand it, ‘direct  access’  should
mean access not (completely?) dependent on mental representations. In
this case, the content a «remembering» could be modeled using a device
analogous  to a  proper name in  a  causal  theory of  reference (Kripke
1980)4:
3 ‘The  earlier  experience  condition’,  expressed  in  (2),  is  not  particularly
controversial. This condition is presupposed in all cases through this paper, regarding
both the causal and simulation theories.
4 I  am not  asserting  that  the  content  of  a  «remembering»  of  individuals  is  a
proposition (see fn. 1). This is a simplified model used to highlight some properties of
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P1a & P2a & … & Pna,
where the predicates P1, P2, ..., Pn model the properties represented in
the «remembering». The direct character of the theory is modeled using
the proper name a in the content of the «remembering». This seems to
be appropriate because, in a causal theory of reference, a proper name
refers to an individual via a causal chain of uses. The reference is not
dependent on properties attributed to the referent5. If the margin of
error is null, then & refers to the logical conjunction. I do not claim to
have  modeled  Bernecker’s  theory  because, if  not  for  other  reasons,
Bernecker’s is a theory  of propositional memory. This is a model of a
‘Bernecker-like’ theory for memory of individuals. Also, this should not
be seen as a model of a relational theory of memory (e.g. Debus 2008)6.
Target selection for the direct causal theory is very simple because
the  targets  of  a  «remembering»  are referred  in  its  content.  If  a
«remembering» has content of the form P1a & P2a & … & Pna, then its
target  is  the  individual  a.  The  direct  causal  theory  seems  to  be
inescapably committed to the background assumption for two reasons.
First,  a «remembering»  represents  its  targets  as  one  (and only  one)
individual. This is supposed to be a general feature of «remembering»s,
which all theories should express (Perrin et al. 2020: 5)7. Second, that
the theory that are relevant to our discussion.
5 The  reference  of  a  causal  proper  name  does  not depend  on  attributions  of
properties, but it can involve attributions of properties. For example, the proper name
‘Holy Roman Empire’ attributes properties to some, but refers to something that is
“neither holy, Roman nor an empire” (Kripke 1980: 26). The same holds for a direct
theory of memory: a «remembering» represents its targets as having properties, but
which target is selected is not determined by how it is represented.
6 A relational «remembering» would have individuals themselves as constitutive
parts. A “direct” «remembering» has a causal naming devices as constitutive parts.
7 “As far  as episodic memory is concerned, it  characterizes  the particularity of
experienced  and  remembered  events  that  are  represented  by  the  memories,  for
instance such or such particular event of going to the university on a specific day (e.g.
the time I meet an old friend on the tram as I was heading towards the university), in
contrast with the iterative event of doing so. On standard accounts of the content of
episodic memories, they typically represent singular events in this sense”. That this
assumed by “the vast majority of studies” (Perrin et al. 2020: 5).
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the subject is using different naming devices in the same context should be
transparent  to  her8. Note  that, for  other  theories, a  «remembering»
representing its targets as one (and only one) individual does not entail
the background assumption that it must have one (and only one) target.
The accuracy condition for the direct causal theory is as follows: a
«remembering» with content of the form  P1a &  P2a & … &  Pna and,
consequently, target  a  is accurate if and only if (iff)  P1a &  P2a & … &
Pna. In the following, I work under two simplifications about accuracy.
First, since memory is a generative process (Schacter and Addis 2007),
the accuracy condition should include a margin of error for &. I will
partially  ignore  this  issue  until  §4.1.  Second,  the  accuracy  of  a
«remembering» is often measured against an earlier experience of that
individual,  but  I  will  measure  accuracy  directly  in  relation  to  the
targeted individual. This simplification is equivalent to  the assumption
that the earlier experience is accurate9.
The  causal  condition  states  that  there  must  exist  a  causal
connection between a «remembering» and an earlier experience of its
targets (see condition 3 of Martin and Deutscher). However, I will often
talk about the causal connection being between a «remembering» and
its targets, which is equivalent to supposing that the earlier experience
(e.g. perception) is also causal. I will be more cautious when the earlier
experience is not causal (e.g. imaginations)10. The causal theories almost
8 In the Paderewski case (Kripke 1979), a subject is unaware of her using the same
proper name in different contexts. I don’t think that it is possible for a subject to be
unaware that she is using different proper names in the same context because these
names would need to exhibit syntactical  differences.  The prospects for a relational
theory  are  better here because even if  the use of two different proper names in the
same context is  transparent to the subject, which individuals  are being referred to
isn’t.
9 I will specify the character of the earlier experience when it is relevant (e.g. when
the  targets  are  previously  imagined  individuals).  Please  note  that  the  difference
between «remembering» a previously imagined individual (e.g. an imagined person)
and  «remembering»  the  act  of  imagining that individual, which  «remembering»  a
mental event and not the individual.
10 The causal theory is ambivalent about whether a «remembering» of an individual
that was previously imagined can be non-confabulatory. The issue is that imaginations
often target non-existent/occurrent individuals. These are «remembering»s caused by
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always demand the causal connection between a «remembering» and its
targets to be sustained by an appropriate causal chain of memory traces,
which are supposed to have some features, such as not being “deviant”.
These provisos are necessary for distinguishing successful remembering
from relearning. I will briefly discuss memory traces in §4.3.
In addition to the chain of memory traces, some versions of the
causal  theory  demand  the  causal  connection  to  instantiate  a
counterfactual  relation  (e.g.  Bernecker  2010:  98):  “If  S hadn’t
represented at t1 that p* he wouldn’t represent at t2 that p”, where t1<t2
and p* and p refer to the content of the earlier experience and of the
«remembering» (respectively). Other versions of the causal condition
only  demand  the  causal  connection  to  retain  information  about  the
targets: “Remembering occurs  when a person retains  the capacity  to
represent information acquired from past events” (Robins 2017: 2). The
counterfactual condition entails the informational condition, but not the
other way around (see §4.2). I will focus the counterfactual condition
because  the  proposed  causal  theory  has  an  informational  causal
condition and the difficulties of the first will motivate features of the
second. The direct causal theory with counterfactual condition does not
correctly classify the errors in §3 as misremembering or confabulation.
Robins (2020: 124) proposes a taxonomy of memory errors that
uses the accuracy and causal conditions to distinguish cases of successful
remembering, misremembering, and falsidical confabulation [Table 1]11.
Accuracy condition Causal condition
Successful remembering Yes Yes
Misremembering No Yes
Falsidical confabulation No No
Tab. 1: Causal taxonomy for (some) memory errors (Robins 2020: 124).
A misremembering is an inaccurate «remembering» that is caused by its
targets: “When a person misremembers, her report is inaccurate, yet
this  inaccuracy  is  explicable  only  on  the  assumption  that  she  has
an earlier experience of their targets without being caused by the targets themselves.
11 Robins also discuss cases of relearning, but I will not deal with those cases.
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retained  information  from  the  event  her  representation
mischaracterizes”  (Robins  2016a:  434).  In  the  model,  a
misremembering occurs  when a «remembering» with content of  the
form P1a & P2a & … & Pna is caused by the target a, but Pia is false for a
given number of is (depending on the margin of error).
The term ‘confabulation’ was introduced  in the beginning of the
20th century for  describing subjects  with  Korsakoff’s syndrome (see
Berrios 1998 for a review). Afterwards, the term was applied to a wider
range  of  phenomena,  such  as  “the  involuntary  and  unconscious...
recollection  of  episodes,  which  never  actually  happened,  or  which
occurred in a different temporal-spatial context to that being referred
to by the patient” (Dalla Barba 2002: 28). The causal theory describes
confabulation as a «remembering» not caused by its targets12. A falsidical
confabulation is a confabulation with inaccurate content. In the model, a
falsidical confabulation occurs when a «remembering» with content of
the form P1a & P2a & … & Pna is not caused by the target a and Pia is
false for a given number of is (depending on the margin of error).
2.2 Simulation theory
The  simulation  theory  states  that  successfully  remembering  an
individual requires having an accurate representation of that individual
generated by a reliable memory process (Michaelian 2016b: 97). The
first  condition  is  the  accuracy  condition;  I  refer  to  the  second  as
‘reliability  condition’.  In  the  simulation  theory,  a  successful
remembering of an individual may be generated using information from
an earlier experience of the individual, but also other experiences of the
subject, general knowledge about the world, etc (no causal condition).
In  the  literature, the  simulation  theory  is  only  presented  in  an
indirect version (e.g. Michaelian 2016b)13. In an indirect theory, “one
12 “Mnemonic confabulation... occurs when there is no relation between a person’s
seeming to remember a particular event or experience and any event or experience
from their past − either because there is no such event in their past or because any
similarity to such an event is entirely coincidental” (Robins 2020: 122).
13 The prospects for a direct simulation theory depends on a mode of reference
that is  neither causal  nor descriptive. In the first  case, a ‘direct simulation theory’
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remembers something… with a mediating image which represents that
thing” (Bernecker  2008: 65). In  this  case,  the  indirect  content  of  a
«remembering» would be a form of descriptive content, which could be
modeled  using  a  device  analogous  to  the  unique  existential
quantification (Whitehead and Russell 1910: 173):
x(P1x & P2x & … & Pnx),
where the quantifier x should be read as ‘the x’. The expression x(Px)
should be interpreted as being equivalent to x(Px & y(Py  x = y)).
Previous  considerations  about  the  predicates  P1,  P2,  ...,  Pn and  the
margin of error for & apply here.
The indirect content is related to a description theory of reference
(Searle 1958). The use of descriptions to model the indirect character of
the theory is adequate because the meaning of a description is spelled
out without mentioning individuals (not even the individuals, if there
are some, that satisfy the description). The use of definite descriptions is
adequate because a «remembering» represents its targets as one (and
only one) individual (see fn. 7). The existence of a margin of error is
even more pressing for an indirect theory than it is for a direct one.
Often we, creatures with limited cognitive resources, have vague but
successful «remembering»s, which represent its targets as one and only
one  individual  (‘the  x’),  but  fail  to  target one  (and  only  one)
individual14.
Target selection for an indirect theory may use an   function15. If
both the functions work in the same way, target selection for an indirect
would collapse  into  a  causal  theory; in  the  second  case  it  would collapse  into an
indirect theory. The indexical mode of reference seems to be related to the relational
theory.
14 Vague  remembering  is  not  a  problem  for  a  direct  causal  theory  because
reference is secured by a device analogous to a causal proper name. In fact, the vaguer
a «remembering», the more easily it is accurate. This modeling has the consequence
that  the  direct  causal  theory  predicts  successful  «remembering»s  with  less
representational content than the indirect theories.
15 For simplicity, I refer to both the content and the target selection functions as,
but  these  are  different  functions:  the  former  returns  truth-values;  the  latter,
individuals. The difference will be important in §4.1.
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theory would work as follows: if a «remembering» has content of the
form  x(P1x &  P2x & … &  Pnx), then its target is ‘the  x’ that uniquely
satisfies  this  description  (this  is  an  expression  of  the  background
assumption). In this case, the «remembering» does not have a target
when either zero or more than one x satisfy the description. In general,
the  accuracy  condition  for  an  indirect  theory  is  as  follows:  a
«remembering» with content of the form x(P1x & P2x & … & Pnx) and
targets y1, …, yj, ... is accurate iff yi(P1yi & P2yi & ... & Pnyi ) for all yj.
This accuracy condition is  trivial  if  both functions work in the same
way: a «remembering» is accurate iff it has one (and only one) target.
For  a  final  point  about  indirect  theories,  we  could  define  a
provisional  indirect  causal  theory  with  content  and  target  selection
modeled  using   functions  as  above,  and  a  counterfactual  causal
condition. This theory would not correctly classify the memory errors
in §3 as misremembering or confabulation.
The reliability condition is as follows: a successfully remembering
must be generated by a reliable memory process. Roughly, a reliable
memory  process  is  one  that  tends  to  produce  mostly  accurate
representations  (Michaelian  2016a:  6).  Michaelian  insists  that  this
tendency should be understood as a modal (and not a purely statistical)
notion.  This  modal  reading  does  not  preclude  the  existence  of
interesting  connections  between  reliability  and  probability.  For
example, it is reasonable to presuppose that a reliable memory process,
working under normal conditions, produces accurate «remembering»s
with a ratio higher than .5. The (initial) simulation theory  would have
content and target selection modeled using an  function as above, and
the  reliability  condition. This  theory  correctly  classifies  the  memory
errors in §3 as misremembering or confabulation, but its description of
these cases is unsatisfactory.
Michaelian (2016a: 8) proposes a taxonomy of memory errors that
uses the accuracy and the reliability conditions to distinguish cases of
successful remembering, misremembering, and falsidical confabulation
[Table 2]16.
16 Michaelian also discusses cases of relearning and veridical confabulation, where a
confabulation ends up (by mere luck) representing its targets accurately. I will not deal
12
Accuracy condition Reliability condition
Successful remembering Yes Yes
Misremembering No Yes
Falsidical confabulation No No
Tab.  2: Simulationist  taxonomy of  (some) memory errors  (Michaelian
2016a).
A misremembering occurs “when the reliability condition is met but the
accuracy  condition  is  not”. In  the  model, a  misremembering  occurs
when a «remembering» with content of the form x(P1x & P2x & … &
Pnx) is generated by a reliable memory process, but some of its targets yj
are such that Piyj is false for a given number of is (depending on the
margin of error). A falsidical  confabulation “occurs  when neither the
reliability  condition nor the accuracy condition are met” (Michaelian
2016a: 7). In the model, a  falsidical  confabulation is  a  confabulatory
«remembering» with content of the form x(P1x & P2x & … & Pnx), but
some of its targets yj are such that Piyj is false for a given number of is
(depending on the margin of error). Since it is reasonable to presuppose
that  human  memory  systems  in  normal  functioning  and  conditions
implement  reliable  memory  processes,  the  simulationist  notion  of
confabulation refers to situations where human memory systems are not
reliable, which is more akin to the initial use of the notion.
3 Memory errors
The study of memory errors can provide insights about the mechanisms
at work in both successful and unsuccessful memory. The results in “the
science of false memory”, as it has come to be developed (see Brainerd
and  Reyna  2005  for  a  review), describe  enduring  characteristics  of
normal, rather than pathological, memory. For this reason, theories of
memory must predict or, at least, be compatible with these results. I
survey three experimental paradigms: DRM (Deese 1959; Roediger and
McDermott 1995), “lost in the mall” (Loftus and Pickrell, 1995), and
memory-conjunction errors (Reinitz  et al. 1992). Robins cites DRM
with those cases.
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and  “lost  in  the  mall”  as  exemplar  cases  of  misremembering  and
falsidical  confabulation  (respectively).  Michaelian  diagnoses  both  as
misremembering. Neither Robins nor Michaelian have studied memory-
conjunction errors.
3.1 DRM
The DRM (Deese 1959; Roediger and McDermott 1995) paradigm is
composed of two phases. In the study phase, the subjects are presented
with lists of semantically related words. In the test phase, the subjects
are asked to «remember» as many studied words as possible. In a typical
result, subjects  report «remembering» a “lure” word, which was not
studied but is the ‘semantic focus’ of a studied list. This is an example of
a list of words used in the paradigm (‘king’ is the lure):
(King) queen, England, crown, prince, George, dictator, palace, throne,
chess,  rule,  subjects,  monarch,  royal,  leader,  reign  (Roediger  and
McDermott 1995).
Causal theory
The  correct  diagnosis  for  cases  of  DRM  should  be  one  of
misremembering  because  their  explanation  involves  “an  appeal  to  a
particular  past  event  that  has  been  distorted” (Robins  2016a: 434).
Nevertheless, it is difficult to reach this diagnosis within a causal theory
because a misremembering  of the lure would need to be caused by an
earlier experience of the lure, which was not seen in the study phase.
The ‘natural description’ of cases of DRM is that the words seen in
the study phase cause the misremembering of the lure in the test phase.
This  description is  not  available for  a  direct  causal  theory because  a
‘misremembering’ with  content of  the  form  P1a &  P2a & … &  Pna,
where a refers to the lure, would need to be caused by the lure, but the
lure was not seen in the study phase. This would be the description of a
confabulation. If the content of the misremembering is about another
word (not the lure), this would not be a misremembering of the lure.
The  direct  causal  theorist  needs  to  adopt  a  more  convoluted
description. In the ‘list description’, the content of the misremembering
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of  the  lure  would  be  about  a  list  as  a  whole. The  content  of  the
«remembering» would have the form  P1a &  P2a & … &  Pna, where  a
refers to the list seen in the study phase and each of the  P1, P2, ..., Pn
describes a word in the list, except for one (e.g. Pn), which describes the
lure.  This  would  be  a  case  of  misremembering  because  the
«remembering» would be caused by the list seen in the study phase, but
its content would be inaccurate because the lure was not in the list (e.g.
Pn a is false). However, this description is not adequate because subjects
in DRM studies report «remembering» the event of studying the lure
(and not of the list as a whole)17.
As  I  can  see  it,  there  remains  two  options  for  a  direct  causal
theorist.  The  ‘temporal  misattribution  description’  consists  in  the
«remembering» being about the lure but being caused by some other
experience of the lure (e.g. reading the lure in a book years ago). The
result  would  be  of misremembering  because  the  «remembering»
represents the lure as being seen in the study phase18. This description is
artificial because of the appeal to an indefinite event of study, but it is
used  for  other  cases  of  misremembering  (e.g.  Levine  1997).  The
‘reality-monitoring error description’ consists  in  the  «remembering»
being about the lure, but being caused by an act of imagining  the lure
(e.g.  during  the  study  phase,  see  fn.  9).  The  result  would  be  of
misremembering  because  the  «remembering»  represents  the  lure  as
being  studied  (and  not  imagined).  The  reality-monitoring  error
description is more natural than the temporal misattribution one and it
is also used for other cases of misremembering (see Johnson 1997).
The provisional indirect causal theory does no better. The content
of the «remembering» would have the form x(P1x & P2x & … & Pnx),
where P1, P2, ..., Pn represent the properties of the lure (including being
seen in the study phase). Either ‘the x’ that satisfies the description is not
17 “Our  subjects  confidently  recalled  and  recognized  words  that  were  not
presented and also reported that they remembered the occurrence of these events”
(Roediger and McDermott 1995: 812).
18 I sometimes appeal to the property of having been seen in the study phase as
being represented in the content of a «remembering». This ‘representation’ may refer
not  to  an  explicit  representation  but  to  the  feeling  of  pastness,  ownership,  etc
associated with the phenomenology of episodic memory (Perrin et al. 2020 and fn. 1).
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the lure or it is (depending on the margin of error). In the fist case, this
would be a confabulation. In the second, a successful remembering.
Simulation theory
The simulationist  diagnosis  for  cases  of  DRM is  of  misremembering
(Michaelian 2016a: 9). The content of the «remembering» would have
the form x(P1x & P2x & … & Pnx), where the P1, P2, ..., Pn represent the
properties of the lure (including being seen in the study phase). Since
the lure was not studied and the studied words do not have most of the
properties of the lure, the content would be inaccurate, however, since
cases of DRM occur in human memory systems in normal functioning
and  conditions19,  the  diagnosis  would  be of  misremembering.  The
diagnosis  is  correct, but  there  is  something  unsatisfactory  about  this
description: this  would  be  a  case  of  misremembering  ‘of  the  lure’,
which does not target the lure (in fact, which does not have targets at
all).
3.2 Lost in the mall
Loftus  and  Pickrell  (1995: 721)  recruited  24  pairs  of  relatives. The
older  relatives  provided  their  youngers  with  four  stories  about  the
youngers’ childhood (three of which were true; the fourth was a fiction
about  getting  lost  in  the  mall).  The  youngsters  were  asked  to
«remember» the four events. In the most well known result (Loftus et
al. 1996), Chris, a 14-year-old boy, was informed by his older brother,
Jim, that, when he was five, he was lost in a mall in the city of Spokane,
Washington, where  his  family  often went  shopping, and that  he  was
crying heavily when he was rescued by an elderly man and reunited with
his  family.  Over  five days  and  two interviews,  Chris  had
«remembering»s of being rescued by a “really cool” man, of being scared
that he would never see his family again, etc.
19 The  DRM effect  has  been  replicated  extensively  and  can  be  obtained  from
different forms of similarity (categorical, phonological, orthographic); kinds of stimuli
(pictures,  faces,  dot  arrays);  intervals  between  the  study  and  recognition  phases
(hours, days, months ), etc (see Robins 2016a: 434, for the references).
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Causal theory
The ‘official’ causal diagnosis for cases of “lost in the mall” (LTM) is of
falsidical  confabulation  (Robins  2016a:  434).  There  is  a  ‘natural
description’ of  these  cases  available  for  the  direct  causal  theory. The
content of Chris’ «remembering» would have the form P1a & P2a & …
&  Pna, where a refers to the event of getting lost in the mall and  P1,
P2, ..., Pn represent the properties of this event (including being part of
Chris’ past). Since there  isn’t an  event with all  these properties, the
content is inaccurate. For the same reason (as the description goes), that
event cannot be the cause of Chris’ «remembering».
Loftus and Pickrell (1995: 724) adopt the reality-monitoring error
description  for  cases  of  LTM20.  In  this  case, the  content  of  Chris’
«remembering» would have the form  P1a &  P2a & … &  Pna, where a
refers to an imagined event of getting lost in the mall and P1, P2, ..., Pn
represent the properties of that event (including being part of Chris’
past). The «remembering» would be inaccurate because the imagined
event is  not part of Chris’ past, but it  would be caused by an act of
imagining that event (e.g. during the study phase, see fn. 9). This would
be a  diagnosis  of  misremembering.  The  choice  between  the  first
description over the second amounts  to  the  restriction of the  causal
condition  so  that  acts  of  imagining  cannot cause  non-confabulatory
«remembering»s. In this case, the reality-monitoring error description
would not be available, not only for cases of DRM, but for all  cases
described in the literature (e.g. Johnson 1997). These cases would need
to be described as a temporal misattribution of an indefinite event of
study.
The provisional indirect causal theory does no better. The content
of Chris’ «remembering» would have the form x(P1x & P2x & … & Pnx),
where  P1,  P2, ...,  Pn represent the properties  of  this event (including
20 “The development of the false memory of getting lost may evolve first as the
mere  suggestion  of  getting  lost  leaves  a  memory  trace  in  the  brain. Even  if  the
information is originally tagged as a suggestion rather than a historical fact... as time
passes and the tag that indicates that getting lost in the mall was merely a suggestion
deteriorates. The memory of a real event, visiting the mall, becomes confounded with
the suggestion that you were once lost in the mall” (Loftus and Pickrell 1995: 724).
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being part of Chris’ past). Either ‘the  x’ that satisfies this description
does not exist  or is  an imagined event (depending on the margin of
error). In the fist case, this would be a confabulation. In the second,
either an imagination of ‘the x’ cannot properly cause «remembering»s
or it can. In the first case, again, this would be a confabulation. In the
second, a successful remembering.
Simulation theory
The  simulationist  diagnosis  for  cases  of  LTM is  of  misremembering
(Michaelian  2016a: 6). The content  of  Chris’ «remembering»  would
have the form x(P1x & P2x & … & Pnx), where P1, P2, ..., Pn represent the
properties of the event of getting lost in the mall (including being part
of Chris’ past). This content is inaccurate because ‘the  x’ that satisfies
this description is not part of Chris’ past, but cases of LTM occur in
human memory systems in normal functioning and conditions (which
are close to the ecological in LTM experiments). Then the diagnosis is
of  misremembering21. The difference in  diagnosis  between the causal
and  simulation  theories  is  partly  due  to  the different  notions  of
confabulation adopted: where simulationist confabulation applies more
directly to pathological cases, causalists insist in using a broader notion.
I  find  it  plausible  to  describe  cases  of  LTM as  misremembering  or
falsidical (causalist) confabulation22.
21 This would be a case of misremembering without targets, which is reasonable
here since the event of getting lost in the mall (the intended target) did not occur.
22 The causal and simulation theories diverge in diagnosis for reality-monitoring
errors occurring in human memory systems in normal functioning and conditions. I




Fig. 1: The left and middle panels show potential study stimuli, and the
right  panel  shows  a  potential  conjunction  stimulus  constructed  from
them. (Reinitz et al. 1992: 6)
Memory-conjunction  errors  (MCEs)  occur  when  subjects  study  a
number  of  related  items  and  have  a  «remembering»  with  content
constructed from elements of more than one item. Reinitz et al. (1992
E. 6) have tested 48 subjects using line drawings of human faces. In the
study  phase, each  subject  was  presented  with  six  randomly  selected
faces. In the test phase, the subjects were presented with eight stimuli in
a  recognition test: two previously  studied faces  (target  stimuli); two
faces  constructed  by  combining  the  features  of  two  studied  stimuli
(conjunction  stimuli);  two  faces  in  which  features  of  one  studied
stimulus are combined with unstudied features (feature stimuli); two
faces entirely constructed from unstudied features (new stimuli). The
subjects should answer to the question: “Was this one of the faces you
studied?”.  The  relative  frequencies  of  recognition  for  target,
conjunction,  feature, and  new  stimuli  were  .71,  .52,  .19,  and  .13
(respectively). Suppose that subject S was presented with the first two
faces  in Figure 1 and asked to «remembers» the third. Let the first,
second, and third faces be a, b, and c (respectively). Then c is composed
of features of a and b in equal parts (conjunction stimulus, see appx.).
Causal theory
MCEs are problem cases for the direct causal theory for three reasons.
First, the direct causal content yields different (conflicting) descriptions
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of  MCEs, where  there  is  no  reason  whatsoever  for  choosing among
these  descriptions. Suppose  that  the  causal  diagnosis  for  MCEs is  of
misremembering.  The  only  two  descriptions  of  the  content  of  S’
«remembering» available for the causalist are: P1a & P2a & … & Pna and
P1b &  P2b & … & Pnb. There is no reason for deciding which of these
formulas  describe  the  content  of  S’  «remembering»  because  c is
composed  of  features  of  a and  b in  equal  parts. This  is  problematic
because these descriptions are not equivalent from the point of view of
the causal theory, since they pose different causal histories: these are
«remembering»s caused by  a [alternatively, b] but not necessarily by  b
[a]. The second reason has to do with MCEs being cases of ambiguous
misremembering, where (part of) the inaccuracy is caused by multiple
targets23.  The  direct  causal  theory  is  inescapably  committed  to  the
background assumption (see §2.1) and, consequently, the description of
MCEs as ambiguous «remembering»s is not available to the causalist.
The third reason has to do with the counterfactual version of the
causal condition. The counterfactual  condition states that  “If  S hadn’t
represented at t1 that p* he wouldn’t represent at t2 that p” (Bernecker
2010: 98), where this clause should be interpreted as in Lewis (1973b).
In Lewis’ analysis, a counterfactual is true iff its consequent is true in all
possible  worlds  maximally  similar  to  the  actual  world  where  its
antecedent  is  true. The results  of  Reinitz  et  al. show that  there  is  a
(frequentist) probability of 29% of S «remembering» c if she didn’t see a
[alternatively,  b]  in  the  study  phase  (see  appx.).  In  this  case,  it  is
reasonable to  suppose that  S «remembers»  c in  at  least  some of  the
maximally similar worlds where S didn’t see a [b] in the study phase24.
23 Schooler  and  Tanaka  (1991)  distinguish  between  composite  recollections,
«remembering»s  representing features from  multiple  sources,  and  compromise
recollections,  «remembering»s  in  which  previously  experienced  features  are
combined to produce a recollection that represents a perceptual or semantic averaging
of the studied items. MCEs are cases of composite recollection, but cases compromise
recollection can also give rise to ambiguous «remembering»s.
24 Consider  the  “standard  resolution  of  vagueness”  (Lewis  1979:.  472).  The
situations where S «remembers» c without seeing a [alternatively, b]: (1 and 3) do not
involve  violation  of  laws  (of  Physics,  Psychology,  etc),  (2)  maximize  the  space-
temporal match with the actual world (S «remember» c in the actual world), and (4)
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Then the counterfactuals ‘if  S hadn’t seen a [b] in the study phase, she
wouldn’t «remember»  c in the test phase’ are both false and neither  a
nor b fulfill the counterfactual condition. The resulting diagnosis would
be of confabulation25.
It is  not reasonable to diagnose MCEs as confabulations (even in
the  causalist  broader  notion).  Causalist  confabulation  “occurs  when
there  is  no  relation  between  a  person’s  seeming  to  remember  a
particular event or experience and any event or experience from their
past” (Robins  2020: 125). But  MCEs  are  causally  anchored  in  past
experiences of the subject (the study of a and b). In fact, had not S seen
b [alternatively, a] in the study phase, the causal theory would happily
describe  S’  «remembering»  as  a  misremembering26.  Also, if  c were
composed of more features of a [b], there would be reason for choosing
the  first  of  the  two initial  descriptions  and, again, the  direct  causal
theory would happily describe S’ «remembering» as a misremembering.
It is  not reasonable that seeing more faces in the study phase (or the
composition  of  the  third  face  being  slightly  different)  transforms  a
misremembering in a confabulation.
secure similarity of all other particular facts.
25 It is worthwhile to note that Bernecker’s counterfactual condition is a version of
Lewis’ causal  dependence (not causation). Lewis (1973a) himself thinks that causal
dependence, although sufficient, is  not  necessary for causation. Lewis’ causation is
such that a [alternatively, b] is a cause of c when there is a causal chain (e.g. of memory
traces) leading from  a [b]  to  c, where each element of the causal  chain is causally
dependent on the former. This notion is of little help here. Whenever the a-memory
trace interacts with the b-memory trace to form the first c-memory trace in the causal
chain that leads to c, the first c-memory trace is not causally dependent on either the
a-memory trace or the  b-memory trace for the same reasons that c is  not causally
dependent on a or b. Lewis (1973a) is aware of the limitation of his theory in dealing
with cases of overdetermination (e.g. MCEs), which he attempts to dismiss: “I shall not
discuss symmetrical cases of overdetermination, in which two overdetermining factors
have equal claim to count as causes. For me these are useless as test cases because I
lack  firm  naive  opinions  about  them” (Lewis  1973a:  fn.  11).  I  discuss  cases  of
overdetermination in §4.2.
26 The content of  S’ «remembering» would have the form P1a & P2a & ... & Pna,
where, for half of the Pis, it is false that Pia (inaccurate), but the «remembering» would
be caused by a [alternatively, b].
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The provisional indirect causal theory does no better. Similarly to
the direct causal theory, MCEs would be cases of confabulation because
of the counterfactual condition. But the provisional theory has its own
problems  with ambiguous «remembering»s. The indirect content of a
«remembering» (e.g.  S’ «remembering» of  c) would have the form  
x(P1x & P2x & … & Pnx). If both functions work in the same way, cases
where more than one  x satisfy the description (e.g. a and  b) are cases
where  the  «remembering»  has  no  targets.  Cases  of  ambiguous
misremembering would be always diagnosed as confabulations.
Simulation theory
The  simulationist  diagnosis  for  MCEs  is  of  misremembering.  The
content of S’ «remembering» would have the form x(P1x & P2x & … &
Pnx), where  P1,  P2, ...,  Pn represent the features  of  c. No matter the
margin of error, either both  a and  b satisfy the description or  neither
does. In either way, the content would be inaccurate, but cases similar
to MCEs occur in human memory systems in normal functioning and
conditions27.  Then  the  diagnosis  would  be of  misremembering.  The
diagnosis  is  correct, but  there  is  something  unsatisfactory  about  this
description: if both the functions work in the same way, either both  a
and  b satisfy  the  description  or  neither does.  Either  way,  the
«remembering»  does  not  have  targets.  Then  all  cases  of ambiguous
misremembering are described as misremembering without targets.
4 Discussion
In the previous sections, I have shown that DRM, LTM, and MCEs are
problem cases for the direct and provisional indirect causal theories. The
simulation theory classifies these cases correctly, but its descriptions are
unsatisfactory. The most problematic cases were MCEs. The source of
the difficulty is the background assumption that a «remembering» has
one  (and  only  one)  target,  which  is  reflected  in  the  accuracy  and
27 For example, a witness to a crime might claim to have seen an individual’s face
when she had in fact seen several faces that, when taken together, contained most of
the facial features of the accused individual. Brown et al. (1977) tests this possibility in
conditions closer to the ecological.
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counterfactual  conditions  of  these  theories. The  direct  causal  theory
cannot be fixed for these cases because of both its direct content, which
is  inescapably  committed  to  the  background  assumption,  and  its
counterfactual  condition,  which  has  problems  with  cases  of
overdetermination (see fn. 25). Robins’ and Michaelian’s theories can
be  fixed  for  these  cases.  The  margin  of  error  for  accuracy  should
include the uniqueness claim and the target selection function should
return all  the individuals with the highest degree of satisfaction. The
counterfactual condition should be reduced to a probabilistic condition.
The resulting theories classify correctly the errors in §3.
4.1 Accuracy condition
The direct causal theory cannot deal with ambiguous misremembering
because it is inescapably committed to the background assumption. This
is not the case for the indirect theories because it is not transparent to
the subject whether a descriptive content is satisfied by one or more
individuals. There is a related problem for the provisional indirect causal
and  simulation  theories:  when  we  misremember,  we  misremember
something(s), but if both  functions work in the way described above,
then a «remembering» with content of the form  x(P1x &  P2x & … &
Pnx) is accurate iff it has one (and only one) target (and it is inaccurate iff
it  has  no  targets).  This  is  unfortunate  because  there  are  cases  of
ambiguous misremembering and of vague but successful remembering.
The use of an   function for modeling the accuracy condition has
the  consequence  that  all  vague  «remembering»s  are  inaccurate  and,
consequently,  not  successful.  We,  creatures  with  limited  cognitive
resources, most often have vague «remembering»s, whose  content is
not detailed enough to single out one (and only one) individual. If the
accuracy condition demands the content of a «remembering» to single
out one (and only one) individual, then most of our «remembering»s
would be inaccurate. For example, suppose that I know twins that are
identical  except  for  a  minimal  difference.  My  «remembering»  will
hardly single out one of them, especially if their difference is minimal
enough to pass any non-null margin of error. Nevertheless, I should be
able  to  successfully  remember  one  of  them. The  key  to  avoid  this
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problem is to note that x(Px) is equivalent to x(Px & y(Py  x = y)).
The uniqueness claim ( y(Py  x = y)) is as a clause of the full formula
as any Piy and, as such, it should be included in the margin of error for
&. If the margin of error is non-null, the accuracy condition may return
‘accurate’ when two or more individuals satisfy the description (but not
when no one does due to the wider scope of the existential quantifier).
The adjustment  of  the  margin of  error  is  not  able  to  solve  the
corresponding problem for target selection. Suppose, again, that I know
twins that are identical except for a minimal difference. I should be able
to successfully remember one of them, but any (non-null)  margin of
error that selects one of them selects both. In order to deal with this
problem, the target selection function should be plural in the sense of
returning  all  individuals  that  satisfy  the  description  with  the  highest
degree of satisfaction. The plural target function selects the right twin in
our  example. Note  that  targets  outside  the  margin of  error  may be
selected. This is what happens in cases of inaccurate «remembering»s.
The  simulation  theory  should  be  construed  using  the  accuracy
condition and target determination as  described above. The resulting
theory provides consistent diagnoses for the cases in §3. For DRM, the
content of the «remembering» would represent the properties of the
lure (including being seen in the study phase). The target would be the
lure because this is the word with highest degree of satisfaction of the
description. The content would be inaccurate because the lure was not
seen in the study phase. For LTM, the content of Chris’ «remembering»
would represent the properties of the event of getting lost in the mall
(including being part of Chris’ past). The target would be that event.
The content would be inaccurate because the event is not part of Chris’
past. For MCE, the content of  S’ «remembering» would represent the
properties of  c (including being seen in the study phase). The targets
would be a and b because these are the studied faces with highest degree
of  satisfaction  of  this  description.  S’  «remembering»  would  be
inaccurate because  Pia [Pib] is false for half of the  Pi in the description.
Since these «remembering»s are generated by reliable processes, these
would be diagnoses of misremembering.
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4.2 Causal condition
The counterfactual version of the causal condition demands the relation
between non-confabulatory «remembering»s and their targets to be one
of  counterfactual  dependence. This  condition  is  unable  to  deal  with
ambiguous  «remembering»s  because  often  these  are  cases  of
overdetermination  and  counterfactual  theories  of  causation  have
problems  with  those  cases  (see  fn.  25).  MCEs  are  cases  of
overdetermination because the study of a [b] is individually sufficient for
the «remembering» of  c (feature stimuli). The problem counterfactual
theories  of  causation  have with overdetermination is  that “causes  are
thought to be necessary for their effects, in the way that counterfactual
analyses  are  placed  at  center  stage,  but  neither  cause,  given  the
occurrence of its companion, is necessary in overdetermination cases”
(Hall  and  Paul  2013:  146-7).  This  feature  of  the  counterfactual
condition is related to the background assumption.
Historically,  causalists  have  paid  attention  to  the  distinction
between successful remembering and relearning, but much less to cases
of ambiguous «remembering»s. This focus has consequences to which
cases of redundant causation that the theory  can deal with. The three
main cases of redundant causation are joint causation, preemption, and
overdetermination.  Cases  of  joint  causation  are  not  particularly
difficult, but preemption and overdetermination often present issues to
causal  theories.  Since  relearning  often  involves  preemption,  causal
theory of memory is shaped to deal with those cases, but much less with
overdetermination.  Bernecker  discusses  four  cases  of  redundant
causation, where  the  first  is  of  overdetermination  (the  second  is  of
preemption):
[S]uppose  you  are  taking  part  in  a  family  reunion  and  are  trying  to
remember a distant relative’s name. At the very moment when you are
about to remember that the relative is called ‘Bert’ your partner who is
next to you blurts out “Bert, good to see you!”. Your memory that the
person’s  name  is  ‘Bert’  is  causally  overdetermined  by  your  previous
knowledge  of  this  fact  and  by  your  partner’s  blurting.  ...Intuitively,
however, you do remember that the person is called ‘Bert’. (Bernecker,
2008, p. 48)
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This is a sui generis case of overdetermination because your trying to
remember and your partner’s utterance are, in some sense, competing
causes28: if your trying to remember had not occurred, the result would
be a case of relearning (not of successful remembering). This setting is
typical  of  cases  of  preemption. For this  reason, Bernecker has  at  his
disposal a very simple strategy for distinguishing between these cases of
overdetermination  (which  give  rise  to  successful  remembering)  and
cases of preemption (relearning): if  your partner’s utterance happens
before  (as  in  Bernecker’s  second  case), there  is  relearning; there  is
successful  remembering  otherwise. This  solution  is  not  available  for
MCEs because their causes are not competing, but joint (studying both
a and b enhances the probability of «remembering» c). In this respect,
MCEs  are  closer  to  Bernecker’s  third  and  fourth  cases  (of  joint
causation). However, MCEs do not fit those cases completely because
the study of  a [alternatively,  b] is not an  indispensable part of a jointly
sufficient condition for the «remembering» of c.
MCEs are mixed cases of overdetermination and joint causation.
These  are  cases  of  overdetermination  because  the  study  of  a
[alternatively, b] alone can cause the «remembering» of c (19%, feature
error), but these are cases of joint causation because studying both a and
b enhances that probability (52%, conjunction error). This pattern of
causal  influence  is  better  modeled  using  probabilistic  notions.
Reichenbach (1956) and Suppes (1970) propose a probabilistic notion
of causation, where a that occurs at t1 is a cause of b that occurs at t2 iff:
(1) t1 < t2; (2) p(b|a) > p(b); and (3) there is no event a’ occurring at t0
≤  t1 such  that  a’ screens  a off  from  b (i.e.  p(b|a,  a’)  =  p(b|a’))29.
Bernecker dismisses this probabilistic notion of causation and poses two
challenges to  it: (i) “by how much does the conditional probability of
the occurrence of the recounting have to exceed the probability of the
occurrence of the recounting in general?”; (ii)  “it  doesn’t seem likely
28 Your trying to remember and your partner’s utterance are both causes of your
«remembering», which is, in this sense, overdetermined. These are competing in the
sense of being causes of a case of successful remembering and relearning respectively.
29 These were the leading theories of probabilistic causation of the 20th century,
but they have been supplanted by the causal modeling approaches (Pearl et al. 2016).
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that  we  will  ever  be  in  a  position  to  give  precise  values  for  the
probabilities in question” (2010: 95).
The probabilistic notion of causation can be used in a theory that
can  deal  with  the  errors  in  §3.  For  simplicity,  I  focus  on  the
uncontentious part of these theories: if  a that occurs at t1 causes b that
occurs at t2, then t1 < t2 and p(b|a) > p(b) (leaving out the screening off
condition). This uncontentious part defines a minimal causal condition,
in  the  sense  that  all  causal  conditions  should  entail  it. The  minimal
causal theory is construed using accuracy condition and target selection
as defined in §4.1 and the minimal causal condition as defined above. If
we assume the idealization that the representation of each feature Pix is
caused by one (and only  one) individual  a such  that  Pia, then target
determination for this theory would be related to the notion of causal
dominance in the hybrid theory of reference (Evans 1973)30. This leaves
us  with  the  following  analogies  between  theories  of  memory  and
reference: direct causal theory (Bernecker 2008) and causal theory of
reference (Kripke 1980); minimal causal theory and hybrid theory of
reference  (Evans  1973);  simulation  theory  (Michaelian  2016a)  and
description theory of reference (Searle 1958).
The minimal causal theory provides consistent diagnoses for the
errors in  §3.  For  DRM, the  content  of  the  «remembering»  would
represent the properties of the lure (including being seen in the study
phase). The  target  would  be  the  lure  (imagined  in  the  study  phase)
because this is the word with the highest degree of satisfaction of the
description. The content would be inaccurate because the lure was not
seen in the study phase. For LTM, the content of Chris’ «remembering»
would represent the properties of the event of getting lost in the mall
(including being part of Chris’ past). The target would be that event
30 According to Evans, a proper name refers to the dominant causal source of the
information associated with it. Consider a case where ancient documents containing
interesting mathematical proofs are discovered. Inscribed in these documents is the
name ‘Ibn Kahn’, which is now mistakenly taken to refer to the mathematician. In fact,
the person originally named ‘Ibn Kahn’ was the scribe who copied the proofs. Evans
claims that present uses of ‘Ibn Kahn’ refer to the mathematician because the dominant
causal  source  of  the  information  associated  with  the  name  is  the  mathematician.
Michaelian has suggested this relation to me in personal conversation.
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(imagined  in  the  study  phase), but  the  content  would  be  inaccurate
because that event is not part of Chris’ past. If we accept that imagined
individuals can cause non-confabulatory «remembering»s, these  would
be two diagnoses  of  misremembering. For  MCEs, the  content  of  S’
«remembering» would represent the properties of c. The targets would
be  a and  b because these are the studied faces with highest degree of
satisfaction of the description. S’ «remembering» would be inaccurate
because Pia [alternatively, Pib] is false for half of the Pi in the description,
but it would be caused by both a and b because p(c|a) = p(c|b) = .3718
> p(c) = .3024 (see appx.). This would be a misremembering diagnosis.
4.3 Two informational theories of memory
The literature on memory is full of informational talk. Causalists and
simulationists  seem to  agree  that  “the  episodic  memory  system is...
designed  to  draw  on  information  originating  in  past  experience  to
simulate possible episodes” (Michaelian 2016b: 103)31. In sum, “there is
general agreement that the human memory is meant to not only store
but  also  process  the  encoded  information”  (Bernecker  2017:  4),
although I am not sure of the agreement about the ‘storing’ part. There
seems to exist an informational common core to causal and simulation
theories,  but  little  effort  has  been  done  to  make  sense  of  the
informational  character  of  declarative  memory.  In  this  section,  I
implement the minimal causal  and simulation theories  using tools  of
information theory. These  theories  end up to be  are  closely  related,
differing only on how memory transmits information about the past.
Classical information theory (Shannon 1948) provides a measure of
the amount of information associated with a proposition. The theory
measures the amount of information using the principle that the more
probable a proposition is, the less information it carries. The amount of
information  associated  with  a  proposition  b (h(b))  is  calculated  as
follows32:
31 Likewise, Robins (2017: 2) states that  “remembering occurs  when a person
retains the capacity to represent information acquired from past events”.
32 Until now, I have used the symbols  a, b, and  c to refer to faces (objects). For
simplicity, I will use these same symbols to express the propositions that faces a, b, and
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h(b) = −log2(p(b)),
where  p(b) is the probability of  b being true (e.g. b is the proposition
that the event of S studying face b has occurred, see fn. 32). Point-wise
mutual information (pmi) is a measure of the amount of information
shared between two propositions. The pmi between propositions b and a
(i(b; a)) is calculated as follows:
i(b; a) = h(b) − h(b|a)
= h(a) − h(a|b).
The amount of pmi between b and  a is such that −∞ ≤ i(b; a) ≤
min(h(b), h(a)). If i(b; a) < 0, b and a are negatively correlated33. If i(b;
a) = 0, b and  a are independent. If  i(b; a) > 0, b and  a are positively
correlated.  In  an  intuitive  reading,  i(b;  a)  means ‘the  amount  of
information that b transmits about a’ (Dretske1981: 15-6)34.
The minimal causal and reliability conditions are equivalent to two
closely related informational conditions. The minimal causal condition
states that S’ «remembering» b with a given target is non-confabulatory
only  if  the  probability  of  S having  b given  that  S had  a  previous
experience  a  of  that  same  target  is  higher  than  the  unconditional
probability of S having b  (p(b|a) > p(b)). This condition is equivalent to
the following informational condition:
c (respectively) exist and that the event of S «remembering» (studying, etc) faces a, b,
and  c (respectively) have occurred, etc. This will be convenient because, while the
causal condition is defined in terms of earlier experiences, the reliability condition is
defined in terms of targets. I hope the context will disambiguate the uses.
33 Philosophical  work about pmi is scarce. For example, does negative pmi has
meaning beyond negative  correlation?  Is  pmi a  real  quantity, as, for  example, the
amount of mutual information, which is measured in bits? These issues will be relevant
for a discussion in the Conclusions.
34 “We are now asking about the informational value of situation r, but we are not
asking about  I(r). We are asking how much of  I(r) is information received from or
about s. I shall use the symbol Is(r) to designate this new quantity. The r in parentheses
indicates that we are asking about the amount of information associated with r, but the
subscript  s is  meant to signify that we are asking about that portion of  I(r) that is
information received from s. ...Is(r) is a measure of the information in situation r about
situation s” (Dretske1981: 15-6). 
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p(b|a) > p(b)  log2(p(b|a)) > log2(p(b))
 −log2(p(b)) > −log2(p(b|a))
 h(b) > h(b|a)
 h(b) − h(b|a) > 0
 i(b; a) > 0
In  this  interpretation,  a  «remembering»  b with  target  a is  non-
confabulatory  only  if  it  transmits  a  positive  amount  of  information
about  an  earlier  experience  of  a (i(b;  a)  >  0).  For  MCEs,  the
«remembering» of  c transmits a positive amount of information about
the earlier experience of face  a. The same holds for  b (i(c; a) = i(c; b)
= .2981 > 0, see appx.). This result is consistent with a case of non-
confabulatory «remembering», which corroborates the diagnosis of the
minimal causal theory, but opposes those of the direct and provisional
causal  theories. This  absolute informational  condition  (the analogy  is
with absolute/incremental  Bayesian confirmation theories, see Huber
2007: §4c)  vindicates  the  intuition that  (non-confabulatory)  memory
transmits information about the past. This interpretation also provides
answers to Bernecker’s challenges. The answer to the first challenge is
that p(b|a) may be higher than p(b) by any amount because any amount
is enough for memory transmitting information about the past (i(b; a) >
0). The answer to the second challenge is the Appendix: we are able to
calculate the relevant probabilities (if not for ecological) for laboratory
cases and then work the other cases from analogy.
The  reliability  condition  states  that  a  «remembering»  is  non-
confabulatory iff it is generated by a reliable memory process, where a
memory  process  is  reliable  when  it  tends  to  produce  accurate
«remembering»s. It is reasonable to presuppose that a reliable memory
process, under normal conditions, produces accurate «remembering»s
with probability higher than 50%. Consequently, if a reliable memory
process produces a «remembering» with content of the form x(P1x &
P2x & … & Pnx) and target a, then there is a probability higher than 50%
that  x(P1x &  P2x &  …  &  Pnx).  Since  xPx entails  xPx,  there  is  a
probability higher than 50% that x(P1x & P2x & … & Pnx). Since a is one
of  the  individuals  with  the  highest  degree  of  satisfaction  of  this
description, it is reasonable to expect that  a is among the individuals
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that verify the existential claim. Consequently, it is reasonable to expect
that there is a probability higher than 50% that a exists/occurred with
those features. In sum, if a «remembering» b with target a is generated
by a reliable memory process, then it is reasonable to expect that p(a|b)
> .5. This condition is also equivalent to an informational condition:
p(a|b) > .5  p(a|b) > p(¬a|b)
 log2(p(a|b)) > log2(p(¬a|b))
 −h(a|b) > −h(¬a|b)
 h(a) − h(a|b) > h(a) − h(¬a|b)
 i(b; a) > i(b; ¬a)
In  this  interpretation,  if  a  «remembering»  b with  target  a is  non-
confabulatory, then it is reasonable to expect that the «remembering»
transmits more information about the existence/occurrence of  a than
about the opposite (i(b; a) > i(b; ¬a)). For MCEs, the «remembering»
of c transmits more information about a being seeing in the study phase
than about the opposite. The same holds for b (i(c; a) = i(c; b) = .2981
>  i(c; ¬a) =  i(c; ¬b) = −.0348, see appx.). This result is consistent
with a case of non-confabulatory «remembering», which corroborates
the simulationist diagnoses in §3.3 and §4.1. The simulationist would be
an  incremental informational condition (Huber 2007: §4c), which also
vindicates  the  intuition  that  (non-confabulatory)  memory  transmits
information about the past (at least it usually does, see Conclusions).
The informational reading reveals the importance of MCEs for the
theory  of  memory:  MCEs  are  limiting  cases  of  non-confabulatory
memory in a very precise sense. We are working with the data from
Reinitz et al. (1992: E. 6), where the misremembering c has two targets
(a and b), i(c; a) = i(c; b) = .2981 > 0 and i(c, ¬a) = (c, ¬b) = −.0348.
This is consistent with a case of non-confabulatory «remembering» for
both the minimal causal  and simulation theories. However, there are
results  of  MCEs where «remembering»s have more than two targets
(e.g. Leding et al. 2007, where MCEs have three targets). Suppose that
there are results of MCEs that maintain the structure of Reinitz et al.,
but that have three, four, ..., n targets. If these cases behave as those of
Reinitz et al., it is expected that, as n increases, both i(c; a) and i(c; ¬a)
31
approach 0 and the limiting case would be of falsidical confabulation for
both the minimal causal and simulation theories35.
For a final point, the minimal causal condition is minimal in the
sense  that  a  causal  theorist  may  adopt  extra  causal  conditions.  For
example,  causal  theorists  often  demand  causal  connections  to  be
sustained  by  an  appropriate  causal  chain  of  memory  traces.  The
adoption of extra causal conditions would further distinguish causal and
simulation theories, even in  informational  implementation. However,
MCEs also posit problems for this extra causal condition. Reinitz et al.
argue that their results provide evidence for a distributed account of
memory traces36. The problems non-minimal causal conditions exhibit
when used to explain the causal relations between «remembering»s and
earlier experiences in MCEs tend to reappear when they are used to
explain the causal relations within a chain of discrete memory traces
(see  fn.  25).  The  appropriate  causal  chains  would  need  to  be  of
distributed memory  traces.  However,  Robins  argues  that  distributed
memory traces do not provide a way to track their causal history and
are incompatible with causal theories37. I will not discuss this issue here.
35 Reinitz et al. does not contain enough data for the calculation of i(c; a) and i(c;
¬a) for  n > 2 (e.g. about feature stimuli with different proportions of old and new
features). It is  worthwhile to produce experimental results for the case  n = 3 and
check whether it has the same structure as the case n = 2 (i.e. with the frequency of
feature stimuli lying between that of the conjunction and new stimuli). This would be
evidence for the limiting behavior supposed above.
36 “The  results  provide  strong  evidence  against  any  model  that  proposes  that
retrieval involves the activation of a single memory trace that represents a previously
experienced stimulus... In such a system, there is no reason to expect that memory
conjunction  errors  would  occur,  since  memories  are  not  composed  of  smaller
features. In contrast, memory conjunction errors would be predicted if memories for
related stimuli were stored as overlapping representations in which stimulus features
constituted  the  representational  units,  as  distributed  memory  models  propose”.
Roughly, distributed models propose that “memory traces for previously experienced
stimuli are represented as a set of units that roughly correspond to stimulus features”
(Reinitz et al. 1992: 9 and 1).
37 “Distributed  traces  do  not  have  individually  distinguishable  causal
histories. ...Individual traces do not leave a lasting, distinctive mark on the network by
which their unique causal influence on a subsequent representation could be detected,
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5 Conclusions
The causal and simulation theories are often presented as very distinct
views about declarative memory, but the versions of these theories that
can  classify  the  memory  errors  in  §3  are  closely  related  when
implemented using tools  of  information theory. These theories  differ
only on whether the informational  criterion is  absolute (i(b;  a) > 0,
causal theory) or incremental (i(b;  a) > i(b; ¬a), simulation theory).
This difference has implications for the epistemology of memory. For
example, while both theories are externalist, in the sense of not being
transparent to the subject whether a «remembering» is confabulatory or
not, the simulation theory has an extra layer of fallibilism. While the
causal theory entails that non-confabulatory «remembering»s transmit
information about the past, simulation theory is compatible with a non-
confabulatory «remembering» with target a not transmitting (positive)
information about a (when i(c; ¬a) < i(c; a) < 0).
‘Transmitting information about the past’, here, is a property not
of the content of a «remembering», but of the process of generating it.
Consequently,  veridical  confabulations  (usually)  do  not  transmit
information about the past, which seems to be a correct consequence.
Another  consequence  is  that, although  the  distinction  between  non-
confabulatory and confabulatory «remembering»s is well-defined, non-
confabulatory «remembering»s can be less or more distant from being
confabulatory. This seems to be correct because memory is a generative
process and the proximity to confabulation is a measure of when this
process goes wrong. A complete information theory of memory would
consider not only with the amount of information transmitted by the
process of generating a «remembering», but also by its  content. This
theory would be able to deal with the memory errors in §3 directly:
how much of the amount of information transmitted by the content of a
«remembering»is about its target?38 An advantage of this theory would
much less distinguished from the influence of any other distributed pattern” (Robins
2016b: 16-7).
38 For example, the amount of (relevant) information in the «remembering» of c is
of  6  bits  (because  there  are  64  equally  probable  faces)  whereas  the  amount  of
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be the possibility of treating the accuracy and informational conditions
in  a  unified  way39.  Another  advantage  would  be  the  possibility of
investigating both poles  of  declarative memory using the same tools.
After  all, episodic  (object-, event-, etc)  and semantic  (propositional)
memory have contents that transmit information (about the past)40.
Danilo Fraga Dantas
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Appendix
Each subject in Reinitz et al. (1992, E. 3-6) has studied 6 faces chosen
randomly from a pool of 64 faces, constructed from the crossing of 8
sets  of  hair-and-mouth with  8 sets  of  eyes-and-nose. Let the  studied
faces be  aa, ab, ...hh, where the first and second letters refer to hair-
and-mouth and eyes-and-nose sets (respectively). Let Sab mean ‘face ab
was  studied’ and  Rab mean  ‘face  ab was  recognized’.  Let  Sxy be  a
shorthand for Saa  Sab  …  Shh and ¬Sxy be a shorthand for ¬Saa 
¬Sab  ...  ¬Shh (similarly for Rxy and ¬Rxy). The results of E. 6 are as
follows:  p(Rab|Sab) =  p(Rab|Sab,  Sxy) = .71 (target stimuli);  p(Rab|
¬Sab, Say, Sxb) = .52 (conjunction stimuli); p(Rab|¬Sab, Say, ¬Sxb) =
information that it transmits about a is of .2981.
39 There are some issues with the development of this theory. For example, there is
an incongruence between the unit of information in the content of a «remembering»
(e.g. bits) and the pmi used to measure the amount of information about the past. For
example, bits are always positive and do not have a maximum, whereas the results pmi
may be negative and are bounded by a maximum (−∞ ≤ i(b; a) ≤ min(h(b), h(a))). It is
also not clear whether this theory should be developed using the classical or a semantic
notion of information (see Floridi 2019).
40 I would like to thank Kourken Michaelian, César Schirmer dos Santos, and the
members of UFSM’s Philosophy of Memory Lab for their helpful comments. I  am
deeply  grateful  to  Jaime  Rebello  and  Paulo  Faria, who  were responsible  for  my
learning about memory and Philosophy of Language. A previous version of this paper
was presented on Santa Maria-Grenoble Memory Workshop (October 2018). I thank all the
participants to  this event (including André Sant’Anna) for their stimulating remarks.
This work was funded by CAPES.
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p(Rab|¬Sab, ¬Say, Sxb) = .19 (feature stimuli); and p(Rab|¬Say, ¬Sxb)
= .13 (new stimuli). Let the faces a and b in §3.3 be the faces aa and bb
(respectively). Face c is ab (hair-and-mouth a and eyes-and-nose b). The
amount  of  information  that  the  recognition of  c transmits  about  the
study of  a (i(Rab;  Saa))  and about  the  absence of  study of  a  (i(Rab;
¬Saa)) are calculated as follows, where  C(n, m) =  [n  * (n−1) * … *
(n−m−1)]/m!  is  the  number  of  combinations  of  size  m from  n
elements41:
p(Rab|Saa) = p(Rab|Saa, Sab)*p(Sab|Saa) +
p(Rab|Saa, ¬Sab, Sxb)*p(¬Sab, Sxb|Saa) +
p(Rab|Saa, ¬Sxb)*p(¬Sxb|Saa)
= .71 * C(62, 4)/C(63, 5) +
.52 * [C(62, 5) − C(55, 5)]/C(63, 5) +
2 * {.19 * [C(56, 6) − C(49, 6)]/C(64, 6)} +
.13 * C(49, 6)/C(64, 6)
= .71*.01 + .52*.23 + 2*(.19*.25) + .13*.19
= .3024
Roughly, the probability of  face  ab being studied (p(Sab)) is  the ratio
between the number of situations where ab is seen, i.e. where the set of
six shown faces are composed of ab plus five other faces drawn from the
63 remaining (C(63, 5)), and the total number of cases where any  six
faces are shown from the pool of 64 faces (C(64, 6)). Similar reasoning
applies for the other probabilities.
p(Rab|Saa) = p(Rab|Saa, Sab)*p(Sab|Saa) +
p(Rab|Saa, ¬Sab, Sxb)*p(¬Sab, Sxb|Saa) +
p(Rab|Saa, ¬Sxb)*p(¬Sxb|Saa)
= .71 * C(62, 4)/C(63, 5) +
.52 * [C(62, 5) − C(55, 5)]/C(63, 5) +
.19 * C(55, 5)/C(63, 5)
= .71 * C(62, 4)/C(63, 5) +
.52*[C(62, 5) − C(55, 5)]/C(63, 5) +
41 The results for b are the same, substituting bb for aa.
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.19*C(55, 5)/C(63, 5)
= .71*.08 + .52*.43 + .19*.50
= .3718
p(Rab|¬Saa) = p(Rab|¬Saa, Sab)*p(Sab|¬Saa) +
p(Rab|¬Saa,¬Sab,Say,Sxb)*p(¬Sab,Say,Sxb|¬Saa)+
p(Rab|¬Saa, Say, ¬Sxb)*p(Say, ¬Sxb|¬Saa) +
p(Rab|¬Say, Sxb)*p(¬Say, Sxb|¬Saa) +
p(Rab|¬Say, ¬Sxb)*p(¬Say, ¬Sxb|¬Saa)
= .71 * C(62, 5)/C(63, 6) + 
.52*[C(62,6)-C(56,6)-C(55,6)+C(49,6)]/C(63,6) +
2 * {.19 * [C(55, 6) − C(49, 6)]/C(63, 6)} +
.13 * C(49, 6)/C(63, 6)
= .71*.10 + .52*.21 + .19*.22 +.19*.27 +.13*.21
= .2952
i(Rab; Saa) = h(Rab) − h(Rab|Saa)
= −log2[p(Rab)] + log2[p(Rab|Saa)]
= −log2(.3024) + log2(.3718) = .2981
i(Rab; ¬Saa) = h(Rab) − h(Rab|¬Saa)
= −log2[p(Rab)] + log2[p(Rab|¬Saa)]
= −log2(.3024) + log2(.2952) = −.0348.
References
Aranyosi, István. 2020. Preteriception: memory as past-perception. Synthese.
Dalla Barba, Gianfranco. 2002. Memory, Consciousness and Temporality. Dordrecht: 
Springer.
Bernecker, Sven. 2008. The Metaphysics of Memory. Dordrecht: Springer.
Bernecker, Sven. 2010. Memory: A Philosophical Study. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bernecker, Sven. 2017. A causal theory of mnemonic confabulation. Frontiers in 
Psychology 8: 1207.
Berrios, German. 1998. Confabulations: a conceptual history. Journal of the History of 
the Neurosciences 7(3): 225–41.
Brainerd, Charles and Valerie Reyna. 2005. The Science of False Memory. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
36
Brown, Evan; Kenneth Deffenbacher, and William Sturgill. 1977. Memory for faces 
and the circumstances of encounter. Journal of Applied Psychology 62(3): 311–8.
Cummins, Robert. 1996. Representations, Targets, and Attitudes. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Debus, Dorothea. 2008. Experiencing the past: a relational account of recollective 
memory. Dialectica 62(4): 405–432.
Deese, James. 1959. On the prediction of occurrence of certain verbal intrusions in 
free recall. Journal of Experimental Psychology 58: 17–22.
Dretske, Fred. 1981. Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Evans, Gareth. 1973. The causal theory of names. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
47: 187–208.
Floridi, Luciano. 2019. Semantic conceptions of information. In The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward Zalta. URL = 
<plato.stanford.edu/entries/information-semantic>.
Hall, Ned and Laurie Paul. 2013. Causation: A User’s Guide. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Huber, Franz. 2007. Confirmation and induction. In Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
ed. by Fieser, James and Bradley Dowden. URL = <iep.utm.edu/conf-ind>.
Johnson, Marcia. 1997. Source monitoring and memory distortion. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 352(1362): 1733–45.
Kripke, Saul. 1979. A puzzle about belief. In Meaning and Use, ed. by Avishai Margalit. 
Dordrecht: Reidel.
Kripke, Saul. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Leding, Juliana; James Lampinen, Norman Edwards, and Timothy Odegard. 2007. The
memory-conjunction error paradigm: normative
data for conjunction triplets. Behavior Research Methods 39(4): 920–5.
Levine, Linda. 1997. Reconstructing memory for emotions. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General 126(2): 165–77.
Lewis, David. 1973a. Causation. Journal of Philosophy 70(7): 556–67.
Lewis, David. 1973b.Counterfactuals. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell.
Lewis, David. 1979. Counterfactual dependence and time’s arrow. Noûs 13(4): 455–
76.
Loftus, Elizabeth; James Coan and Jacqueline Pickrell. 1996. Manufacturing false 
memories using bits of reality. In Implicit Memory and Metacognition, ed. by Reder, 
Lynne. London: Psychology Press.
Loftus, Elizabeth and Jacqueline Pickrell. 1995. The formation of false memories. 
Psychiatric Annals 25(12): 720–5.
Martin, Charles and Max Deutscher. 1966. Remembering. Philosophical Review 75: 
161–96.
37
Michaelian, Kourken. 2016a. Confabulating, misremembering, relearning: the 
simulation theory of memory and unsuccessful remembering. Frontiers in Psychology 7: 
1857.
Michaelian, Kourken. 2016b. Mental Time Travel: Episodic Memory and Our Knowledge of the
Personal Past. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Pearl, Judea; Madelyn Glymour, and Nicholas Jewell. 2016. Causal Inference in Statistics:
A Primer. Hoboken: Wiley.
Perrin, Denis; Kourken Michaelian, and André Sant’Anna. 2020. The phenomenology 
of remembering is an epistemic feeling. Frontiers in Psychology 11: 1531.
Reichenbach, Hans. 1956. The Direction of Time. Berkeley: University of California 
Press.
Reinitz, Mark; William Lammers, and Barbara Cochran. 1992. Memory-conjunction 
errors: miscombination of stored stimulus features can produce illusions of memory. 
Memory & Cognition 20(1): 1–11.
Robins, Sarah. 2016a. Misremembering. Philosophical Psychology 29(3): 432–47.
Robins, Sarah. 2016b. Representing the past: memory traces and the causal theory of 
memory. Philosophical Studies 173(11): 2993–3013.
Robins, Sarah. 2017. Contiguity and the causal theory of memory. Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy 47: 1–19.
Robins, Sarah. 2020. Mnemonic confabulation. Topoi 39: 121–32.
Roediger, Henry and Kathleen McDermott. 1995. Creating false memories: 
remembering words not presented in lists. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition 21: 803–14.
Schacter, Daniel and Donna Addis. 2007. The ghosts of past and future: a memory that 
works by piecing together bits of the past may be better suited to simulating future 
events than one that is a store of perfect records. Nature 445(7123): 27.
Schooler, Jonathan and James Tanaka. 1991. Composites, compromises, and CHARM: 
what is the evidence for blend memory representations? Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General 120(1): 96–100.
Searle, John. 1958. Proper names. Mind 67(266): 166–73.
Shannon, Claude. 1948. A mathematical theory of communication. Bell System Technical
Journal 27: 379–423.
Suppes, Patrick. 1970. A Probabilistic Theory of Causality. Amsterdam: North-Holland 
Pub. Co.
Tulving, Endel. 1985. Memory and consciousness. Canadian Psychology 26 (1): 1–12.
Whitehead, Alfred and Bertrand Russell. 1910. Principia Mathematica, Vol. 1. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
